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Abstract
This paper adopts reputable analytical techniques for identifying near and long term strategic
success factors in the space telecommunications industry. Main conclusions of an industry analysis
point to leverage attainable through moving quickly and massively, establishing large market share
and production volumes, and getting unit costs down. However, limitations in the efficiency of
launch vehicles, and the capacity of the global launch infrastructure, will continue to pace progress.
It is then proffered that launch costs per pound might not be the best strategic metric of progress;
rather, that more strategically important cost-reduction opportunities might lie in improving the
overall characteristics of whole value chains viewed as systems, aimed at reducing the cost per service
delivered over whole life cycles.

Introduction
Despite deregulation in the U.S., parts of the communications sector have characteristics of
relatively mature industries [1]: production overcapacity, heavy concentration in a few dominant
firms, fierce head-to-head competition, clearly defined market segments, etc. [2,3]. However, not all
the world is industrialized and the nature of communications industries varies. In India, for example,
less than 2% of the population has telephones, and two million others are on waiting lists [4]. In
such places (and especially where industrialization is less advanced,) the communications industry has
characteristics of emerging industries: lack of infrastructure, technological uncertainty, exploding
growth, etc.
Rather than (or in addition to) extending land-based communications infrastructures, the best
way to further develop and integrate global communications should (and will) involve further
commercialization of outer space and associated technologies. Relatively nonexistent infrastructures
in developing regions can be developed satellite-based about as easily as they can be developed by
employing terrestrial technologies, for example, and the continued expansion of cellular telephony
and the internet present a similar opportunity for continued growth in industrialized nations.
A quick look at related economic figures can lead to disparate speculations. According to the
U.S. Federal Communications Commission, all sectors combined, telecommunications was a $550
billion industry in 1996, and will be a one-trillion dollar industry as soon as the year 2001. Yet of
that, space-based telecommunications will command about $41 billion (4%) in 2001 [5]. One might
assume from these numbers that the land-based incumbency has distinct first-mover advantages (in
fact, that billions of dollars invested in establishing an enormous base over decades makes it an
intractable incumbency.) Or, one might prefer to assume that space-oriented new entrants have an
open frontier, and a golden opportunity to create rules of competition in their favor. This discussion
will combine both perspectives, and space commerce in general will be viewed both as an emerging
industry, and a competing, substitute industry.
Here, it is tempting to try to portray the commercial space industry plainly in terms of the
most contemporary and newsworthy market segments, technologies, strategies, and so forth [1].
However, much uncertainty still exists and many unforeseeable changes are certain. As plain as the
existence of some technology and market parameters may seem, the histories of the evolutionary
patterns of many other industries teaches us to not assume that these parameters will prevail.
Therefore, the author avoids the noted temptation, and chooses to not make speculations about
specific firms, technologies, and markets. The author assumes that the intended audience of this
paper is generally familiar with the major players, products, and goals of the major players, and feels
that presenting a few macro-measures will suffice as a framework for the ensuing discussion.
According to the consulting firm Peat Marwick, all sectors of the space industry amounted to
a $77 billion opportunity in 1996, and will grow to $121 billion in 2000 [6]. Of this, infrastructure
and launch vehicles comprised $47 billion (61%) in 1996, and will comprise $60 billion (49%) in
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2000. Telecommunications comprised $23 billion in 1996, and will comprise $46 billion in 2000.
The figures for emerging applications are $4 and $12 billion, respectively. According to Merrill
Lynch, in 1998 the market for satellites constituted about a $45 billion industry in 1998, and will
grow to about $68 billion in 2001 and $155 billion in 2006 [7]. The largest and fastest growing
niches will be mobile satellite services and multi-media, followed by direct-to-home television and
fixed satellite services. Certainly, these numbers circumscribe a level of economic activity, and
potential for profitability, that compels thorough inspection at all levels of analysis. Though being
an arbitrary choice, the author feels that a focus on space telecom is nonetheless representative of
space commerce in general. A brief industry-level analysis follows, based on a review of trade
literature over a one-year period.

Industry Analysis
Industry analysis is a technique, anchored in Industrial Economics, developed to help firmlevel strategists and industry policy makers to penetrate the inherent economic opportunities and
threats that characterize an industry [1,8,9]. An industry is conceived to be the sum and structure of
its economic forces, summarized by five factors: the intensity of rivalry, the threat of entry, the
threat of substitution, the bargaining power of suppliers, and the bargaining power of buyers. Once an
industry is dissected, profitability patterns clarify, and essential strategic actions often become
apparent. As telecommunication satellites seem so important to leading the true commercialization
of space, next is a cursory analysis of the space telecommunications spacecraft (satellite)
manufacturing and operations industry. (The definition of this "industry," especially as it integrates
satellite manufacturing and satellite communication operations, is strictly an interpretation of the
author, guided by theoretical considerations of the problems determining the boundaries of any new,
dynamic, and/or amorphous industry [10,11].)
Rivalry: First, the intensity of industry rivalry is indicated by the number of competitors and
their size, although absolute and relative power are really the issue [1]. The major players in the
space telecommunications industry are relatively few and clearly identifiable. However, when firms
are reasonably well-positioned against each other in terms of their capabilities, it takes a surprisingly
small number of firms to make an industry competitive. The prevalence and competitiveness of
oligopolies exemplify this statement. On the whole, it can be seen that the most dominant firms
participating in space telecom have corporate sponsors with a variety of strengths, fostering a
multidimensional, heterogeneous but otherwise fairly high level of rivalry.
In contrast, the rapid growth rate of the telecommunications market implies that space
telecom industry rivalry is not high, though the reasoning is a little obtuse. When a market's growth
rate exceeds industry production capacity and capacity growth, it is often easier and more
strategically prudent to avoid head-to-head competition and simply grasp for market share in
unexplored and burgeoning market segments [1]. Rivalry in such a scenario might be thought of as
occurring between individual firms and the clock, not among firms per se.
Next, the differentiability of a product/service plays an important role in determining rivalry.
Differentiation refers to product/service attributes that are perceptible to consumers and valued
enough to command a premium price [1]. (Here, differentiation should not be confused with
segmentation. The former term is assumed to be a consumer-level phenomenon, while the latter is a
consumer group-level phenomenon, a level of analysis avoided for reasons described earlier.) Or,
conversely, when perceived attributes are roughly the same, price typically differentiates products.
In space telecom, fine-grained consumer differentiation is difficult to yet assess (relative to what will
occur as the industry develops,) and this is typical. But over a longer-term, bases of differentiation
typically evolve in any industry, and change from performance-based differentiation to cost/price
differentiation.
Furthermore, technology-defined industry boundaries, and market-defined industry
boundaries, are not necessarily aligned with each other, especially in emerging industries [12]. So in
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addition to market segment phenomena, future industry structure will be shaped by the evolution of
various technologies, a difficult area to forecast and beyond the scope of this paper [13,14]. What
seems more plain is that space telecom has terrestrial rivals, so one clear basis for understanding
near-term competition is to view one group of land-oriented firms as being positioned against
another group of space-oriented firms. At an inter-industry level, these sets of providers seem
differentiable from each other in terms of both performance and cost/price, though much of the
argument is yet to come. But to preview an upcoming conclusion, profitability in space telecom will
be affected to the extent that costs reach levels where space and terrestrial-based telecom are
similarly priced for services that are perceived as very similar.
Switching costs also affect rivalry [1]. Switching costs are the costs borne by a consumer of
changing a purchase decision, which can economically segment an industry which might be seamless
in most other terms. For example, a consumer of a specific space telecom service might spend
several thousand dollars to buy a unique type of telephone [15,16]. This is an obvious barrier to
switching from land-based service. And to switch to another provider might necessitate the
repetition of this investment. The presence of some switching costs does suggest some attenuation of
rivalry. On the other hand, it is also typical for switching costs to become obviated over time by
extensive standardization and convergent improvements in technologies [17,18]. Altogether, there
are near-term switching costs in space-based telecom but they should decay over time.
Next, to the extent that fixed costs in an industry are high, rivalry tends to also be high [1].
High fixed costs imply high breakeven production volumes, intensifying the importance of achieving
high levels of market share. Clearly, the fixed (and/or sunk) costs of participating in space telecom
are very high. This infers tough rivalry as players compete for market share and production
volumes, even during the early years of the industry, so as to establish first-mover advantages.
However, the payback periods suggested in the popular media (to the extent that they are realistic)
are short (especially considering the huge costs.) This implies that the kind of scale-based rivalry
seen in other parts of aerospace like aircraft manufacturing (where payback periods are typically well
over ten years) should not become the most compelling factor, but they could become a minimum
requisite element for firm-level survival.
The perishability of a product/service also affects industry rivalry [1]. Perishability might
sound irrelevant to the robust characteristics of satellite hardware and software, but it is the
perishability of the service they provide that matters. As a microcosmic example, any discrete
phone call made via terrestrial cable today is a phone call that will not be made via satellite; as a rule,
services are infinitely perishable. Thus the scramble for volume can be quite mad (witness longdistance telephone service providers,) resulting in intense rivalry. On this account, and as it probably
interacts with other factors, first-mover advantages in space telecom loom important.
The nature of added production capacity affects rivalry, and at present, space telecom
capacity is basically being added one satellite constellation at a time. After constellations become
operational, capacity might be better thought of as being added a few satellites at a time, but even
individual satellites handle many thousands of customers, and each satellite capability costs many
millions of dollars to establish. When industries are mature and markets are saturated, such a
situation has the tendency to disrupt supply-demand equilibria and often triggers price wars.
However, in the near term there looks to be plenty of unserved telecom market to accommodate
foreseeable capacity additions, postponing significant impacts of this specific phenomenon.
Finally, exit barriers affect rivalr [1]. When for any reason -- psychological, economic, or
otherwise -- it becomes difficult for players to exit an industry, industry overcapacity can result from
the continued presence of many desperate, marginal players. In space telecom, for example, very
significant debt and liability needs to be incurred just to enter the industry, making it difficult to exit
before that debt and other obligations are serviced. Significant and sometimes unique investments
must also be made in human and physical capital, making disinvestment difficult or costly. However,
once again, the sheer munificence of the space telecom market should delay the issue, to the extent
that unmistakable and abundant opportunities mask competitive weaknesses.
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Threat of Entry. The threat of entry affects competition and industry profitability by
placing a cap on average prices [1]. When economic factors impede entry and additional
competition, prices rise to levels mitigated by other factors. First, the threat of entry is affected by
inherent economies of scale. Especially if such economies are already being enjoyed by existing
industry players, entry is made difficult by the amount of money and effort it would take to enter at
a high capacity -- otherwise the new entrant would incur unit cost disadvantages. Economies of scale
exist in space telecom in several forms, though the industry is probably still too youthful for any
firm to yet have an unassailable advantage in them. But economies of scale are powerful
phenomena, and must be exploited (along with high utilization rates) to help bring unit costs and unit
prices down to levels that facilitate mass-market-like share volumes.
Likewise, to the extent that the amount of capital required to gain entry is high, the threat of
entry is obviously low [1]. Given the billions of dollars it takes to compete in space telecom, the
likelihood that many new entrants will invade is low. Thus some rivalry will be precluded.
In space telecom, as has been true of any industry, success can be limited by the availability
of raw resources [1]. Here, the availability of technology does not seem to be as limited as the
availability of more mundane resources [19,20]. Capital is a key and finite resource, and the inability
to obtain financing will almost certainly continue to be one of the most severe impediments to entry
[5].
Next, in much the same way that differentiation affects rivalry, it also affects the threat of
entry [1]. A more specific concern here is differentiation affected by proprietary positions. To the
extent that a defensible technology adds perceptible value to a product, economic returns are implied.
However, the perception of value is key [8], and it is always consumers' perceptions that matter the
most. In the simplest sense non-value adding technologies, even proprietary ones, bring unnecessary
costs (unless, in contrast, their whole purpose is to reduce costs [21].) This is important because in
space telecom, it is the standardization of many technologies, not their uniqueness, that will
constitute the basis of an unfragmented industry. And fragmented industries, by definition, impede
the full flowering of otherwise-inherent economies of scope and scale [1]. Ironically, much (not all,
of course) of the hardware and software underpinning and continuously improving the commercial
viability of space telecom will need to be commonly available, inexpensive, and reliable.
However, a "technology" is more than hardware and software and, for example, can lie
tacitly in an organization's human capital, organizational processes and procedures, and so forth.
Indeed, patents tend to be easily imitated, but organizational capabilities are often much more
defensible and serve as ultimate sources of high economic returns [22]. Thus, it is argued, the threat
of entry in space telecom is low not so much because of its hardware and software sophistication, but
because establishing a constellation of satellites is a remarkable, rare, and difficult-to-imitate
organizational capability.
Similarly, experience and learning curves affect the threat of entry [1]. Firms with profound
levels of experience at space telecom services should have a lead over potential rivals with little or
no experience. However, cumulative production volume, not time, is the basis of both experience
and learning effects. Thus market and production volumes again surface as key objectives. Astute
readers will have noticed the potential "Catch-22" in this situation. It is difficult to become efficient
and lower costs without experience, and experience comes with production volume, but high
production volumes of undifferentiated products/services are difficult to "move" unless prices are low,
which are difficult to establish unless costs are already low.
The likelihood of entry is also affected by government policies. Here, entry is being made
more opportune. First, the commercial use of space is becoming appreciated as an industry that is
vital to national economic interest [23,24]. Second, it is apparent that a transition is underway
between space R&D as an upstream business and the extensive operation of commercialized
products, so time is of the essence [25]. Third, and as a result, governments are promoting the
commercial use of space not only in spirit, but in law [26]. On balance the likelihood of new entry is
increasing due to these trends and agendas.
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Finally, access to distribution channels and the availability of favorable locations affect entry
[1]. In space telecom, the availability of favorable locations would refer to the availability of orbits
and bandwidths, both regulated by governments [24]. At present these resources seem to be
reasonably available though again, they are not infinite and early entry might prove to be preemptively important.
But it is the access to distribution channels that seems to be one of the most imposing
barriers to not only entry, but to expansion by existing players, and growth of the industry as a
whole. Discussion of this factor will consume much of the remainder of this paper.
Bargaining power of suppliers and buyers. Defining the structure of an industry is always
problematic [1]. It is arguable whether the providers of launch products and services are buyers,
suppliers, or full partners to the space telecommunications industry. Furthermore, regardless of one's
theoretical preferences, it is a fact that a very significant amount of backward, forward, and/or
horizontal integration exists among the players [25]. The position taken here is that defining this
industry's boundary is secondary to the common sense observation that physical satellite positioning,
and therefore commercialization, can not happen without a launch service and launch vehicle
manufacturing base, which altogether behaves like a value-adding outbound logistics infrastructure [8].
Hence the players will be considered to be logistics suppliers with the opportunity to bargain [27,28].
Virtually all major considerations point to a large amount of power held by launch service and
vehicle providers. First, an estimated 1,000 commercial launches will be needed in the upcoming
decade [29]. But there are very few launch pads in the world, creating a serious bottleneck which
governments have both subsidized and monopolized for almost all of the space age to date. At
present some of these facilities are being privatized [30] and new ones are under strictly-commercial
development [31], but years will elapse until the launch infrastructure bottleneck is appreciably
relieved. In the meantime launch costs should remain very high, and prices are likely to be valuebased.
Second, launch vehicles have historically had significantly differentiated capabilities. There
has been some overlap as to payload bulk, weight, operating envelopes, etc., but in the present sense
commercially viable launchers have had relatively unique spectra of performance. Anyway, even if
launchers were directly competitive in this simple sense, switching costs among satellite
manufacturers and launch providers would still be significant, since seamless working relationships
between a satellite manufacturer and a launch service provider can not be quickly or easily
reconstituted. Fourth, and as stated, the boundaries among satellite manufacturers and launch service
providers are unclear and there is significant integration among them [32]. Satellites are designed
with launch vehicle capabilities taken carefully into consideration. Fifth, the importance of the
quality of a rocket is extremely crucial and not entirely predictable. It is still not uncommon for
launchers to explode during commercial operations, wiping out hundreds of millions of dollars of
investment in a second [33,34]. This bodes well for the bargaining power of the most reliable
launcher providers. As evidence, launch services are reported to be one of the three top cost
categories of communication satellite system establishment, along with the cost of satellites
themselves and the cost of insurance (which, obviously, is related to launcher reliability) [35].
Finally, other than a few choices among classic rocket designs, there are at present no real
substitutes for them, collectively. If a firm wants to orbit a satellite, unmanned and non-recoverable
rockets are practically the only viable launch option (other than the U.S. Space Shuttle.) Thus one
sees that much of the inherent profitability of delivering satellite-based telecommunications services
shifts to launch product and service providers. As evidence, launch cost per pound of payload is
always targeted as a key, if not the key to the commercialization of space [5,35]. Consequently the
pressure to lower unit launch costs is intense; nominal industry cost per pound in the late 1990s was
about $10,000 per pound.
Threat of Substitution. The space telecom industry has been characterized as a collective
substitute for similar terrestrial services. Here, much of the market in the industrialized nations is
already being served, and space telecom will be successful to the extent that it provides
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performance/price ratios that rival its land-based competition [1]. On a truly global scale, much of
the telecommunications market is rather poorly served via land or sky. Whichever sector expands
to provide true global service first will have some advantages, but fast followship seems certain and
ultimate performance/price will likely be a key competitive factor. So once more, it seems that
across the industry, capable technologies are or will soon become available (except as pertains to
launchers,) and that price, hence the overall structure of costs, may ultimately prevail as the leading
predictor of strategic success [36,37].
To summarize, in the near-term, some amount of direct head-to-head rivalry should be
postponed by the apparent size and growth rate of the market. The early availability of key
technologies will provide quite high levels of service quality quite early, accelerating price towards
becoming the more powerful differentiator. Likewise, switching costs will not be very high for very
long. High investment and fixed costs, service perishability, the nature of capacity additions,
economies of scale, experience and learning effects, and the finite number of prime "locations" and
amount of investment capital all suggest critical advantages obtainable by moving early and
massively. But enacting strategies aimed at these urgencies will continue to be braked by launch
infrastructure (site, vehicle, and launch service) limitations, retarding growth and cost economies, and
injuring price flexibility, revenue, and overall profitability. In the meantime terrestrial
communications providers will continue to expand and some lost market share will be difficult to
capture. This overall pattern is typical of the early stages of many industries' evolution, especially
highly-capitalized and scale intense industries [1]. The biggest difference here seems to be that price
will be an early differentiator, and that the mass-market will develop early.
As the industry transitions from relative infancy to rapid growth en route to eventual
maturity, some product life cycle possibilities are as follows [38,39]. As service differentiation
evolves quickly from performance to price, key organizational competencies will transition from
engineering skills to marketing skills to production skills. A relatively amorphous set of industry
"rules" of all kinds will eventually clarify and maybe rigidify, facilitating clearly defined market
segments, dominant satellite designs, overall industry standards, etc. Along with the appearance of
such structure will dissolve much of the opportunity to create or change the rules in any one firm's
favor. The key to operations strategy will shift from design to manufacturing. The keys to rivalry
will change from being inter-industry to intra-industry. Established percentages of the share of eversophisticated markets (including the mass-market) will become more jealously guarded. However,
market saturation should not occur early, postponing the sometimes ruinous dynamics of industry
overcapacity. Again the conclusion is that moving early and massively seems certain to convey
latter-phase advantages, so sustaining mid-term growth, at least in absolute terms and preferably in
share as well, may be essential. Along the way, economic opportunities of new proprietary
technologies should be carefully assessed against the alternative benefits of universal standards and
open architectures. But few firms will fully prosper until all links in the supply chain are established
and rationalized. This means that bottlenecks and inefficiencies in the global launch infrastructure
are poised to impede growth of space commerce into a true mega-industry. And due to the pressures
described to this point, there are indications that the early players are falling somewhat into a classic
trap, that being the tendency to suboptimize long-term value-chain cost structures in favor of
resolving near-term marketing urgencies and the servicing of impatient debt.

Technological Evolution v. Revolution
While unit launch costs are an understandable obsession given the economics of the nearterm situation, analyzing industry profitability beyond the foreseeable future should also take into
account general multi-decade cost trends that are predictable in an abstract sense. Here, the author
adopts a total system, total life cycle view. Metaphorically, if total industry demand could be
described as a pie, the issue is not how big a slice of the pie the average firm might capture, but how
to structurally enable the maximization of the size of the pie. It is not automatic that market
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demand will force the size of the pie to become as large as its potential; it will be much affected by
strategic decisions made (or ignored!) at the level of the firm, and especially at the level of industry
policy (i.e., public policy and investment.)
It has become axiomatic that in many aeronautical and aerospace systems, when the major
costs of a system begin to accrue, it is often too late to do anything really serious about design
features. Pressured by relatively short-term concerns, R&D, design, and even early manufacturing
investments often seriously suboptimize total life cycle costs, which in the end are often driven by
the costs of maintenance and logistic support [40,41]. Absent from most of the reviewed popular
press, as it tracked the industry in question, was an abiding consideration of the long-term costs of
satellite downtime, replacement, repair, and logistic support. This is an important observation,
considering very large satellite R&D, production, and delivery costs -- the cost to launch a pound of
payload, always cited as a very important parameter, may be a suboptimal metric from the most
strategic view of total system cost, and long-term unit cost. Something like cost per unit of
customer service over the entire life cycle of a constellation may be more correct, as an "objective
function" for maximizing overall industry profitability. This may be a naive firm-level strategic
goal, but there is still time for public policy-makers to shape, even subsidize, incentives for long-term
socioeconomic optimization.
This shift in emphasis to maintenance and logistic support is not just hypothetical, even at
the present stage of the "game" -- in addition to launch failures, in the constellations of
communications satellites already being fielded, very costly failures have occurred [42-45]. Given
existing industry structure and technologies, multi-million dollar satellites must be considered
throwaway items, in the sense that if they fail, they are unrecoverable. It is the author's opinion that
in the end, unit costs will be seen to be driven by total system reliability, where the entire industry
value chain properly bounds "the system." From this point of view, there are two fundamental
choices -- enhance the reliability of the system, or enhance the supportability of the system to
accommodate reliability imperfections. As an obvious illustration, it is conceivable for spaceplanes
to recover failed satellites, and space-based maintenance could prove cost-effective. Fortunately,
reliability and supportability goals are not incompatible, but it is not certain that the structure of the
present value chain properly incentivizes long-term system optimization.
As young as the industry may seem, it is nevertheless dominated by large, not-so-young
corporations. This is not unusual for an emerging industry, but histories of other industries indicate
that today's dominant players might not be the most influential in the long-term. It is often the case
that radical improvements to technologies, architectures and infrastructures require paradigmatically
different thinking [46,47]. The sources of radical innovation are often new start-ups, or
"uncooperative" renegades from an existing industry, or invaders from other industries [48,49].
There is clear evidence that this may be happening in space launch concepts [32]. But to speculate
which firms and technologies will eventually dominate would change the level of analysis maintained
in this paper, and diverge from its purpose. The point is that first-mover advantages enjoyed by the
industrial incumency, already discuseed as being a key to success in a realistic business sense, may
block an evolution -- revolution, really -- towards the most technologically reliable cradle-to-grave
value chain. This is not to suggest that the incumbency will fail society by pursuing a trjactory of
incremental technological evolution; the argument for optimization is admittedly perfectionistic.
To summarize, the "systems" under present consideration might best be bounded broadly as
satellite fleets, launch services, and launcher fleets together, considering all cost and effectiveness
interactions and trade-offs from the moment a technology concept appears to the moment when the
last discrete element of the system is retired. From the very strategic, life-cycle perspective, the best
cost baseline for calculating unit costs is total R&D, production, operations, maintenance, logistic
support, and retirement cost, unitized over total volumes and/or meaningful unit measures of service,
delivered over the operational life cycle. A change in any major life cycle assumption -- changing
the planned length of the operational life cycle, or changing the size of production runs, or even a
change to financial discounting assumptions, has the degree of freedom to modify any per-unit
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metric very significantly. Ironically, sometimes cold, hard business realities, when placed into
strategic context, make profound technological progress seem mundane in purpose and actually
rather essential. It is for fundamental logistical purposes that some technological breakthroughs that
foster the commercialization of space will be made in the next decades.

Summary and Conclusion
The market for communications services is enormous and exploding and presents munificent
business opportunities, especially for first movers and early entrants. Strange for a contemporary
industry however, is that technological innovation in principle products and services may not be the
limiting factor faced by firms developing the space telecommunications sector. Technological
innovations in the development of logistic infrastructures, especially launch vehicles, may be the
limiting factor, along with an inadequate capacity of an inefficient launch infrastructure. A radical
change in the present-day launch technology paradigm will probably be necessary to dissolve the
seams between aeronautical and aerospace fleet operations, and literally push the sphere of seamless
commerce out several hundred miles from the face of the earth. Unfortunately, the near-term
urgency of meeting infinitely perishable demand may pull some technological trajectories towards
suboptimal solutions. Despite the apparent potential for technologies like spaceplanes to bring
payload costs down to levels that would allow explosive growth of space commerce, delivering large
rents to some firms and efficiencies to society in the long run, the history of industrialization makes
it seem very possible that near-term economic forces might lock in different, more costly choices.
However, lost opportunities will always remain somewhat hypothetical and will not negate the very
real socioeconomic gains destined to be otherwise achieved at these interesting frontiers.
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